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The vast bulk of economic activity today involves business corporations. Corporations are 
abstract legal entities that combine legal rights and obligations with a significant degree of 
flexibility. The legal separation between corporations and their stakeholders, including 
shareholders, has been important to the success of the corporate form in organizing long-term, 
large-scale production, while limited liability and the tradability of shares help corporations 
acquire funds from a broad set of investors.  
However, this legal separation exacerbates conflicts of interest between those who control 
corporations and others, including shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, 
public authorities, and the general public. In large corporations, stakeholders vary enormously 
in the information and degree of control they have on corporate actions. Contracts and markets 
do not generally create efficient outcomes if markets are not competitive, contracts are 
incomplete or costly to enforce, or if corporate actions create negative externalities for those 
with little information or control. Laws and regulations can help alleviate these frictions, but 
their design and enforcement are also costly and subject to information and control frictions. 
In recent decades, much emphasis has been placed on aligning the interests of managers 
and shareholders. Managerial compensation typically relies on financial yardsticks such as 
profits, stock prices, and return on equity to achieve such alignment. This development has 
been part of a broader trend referred to as “financialization,” whereby the financial sector and 
financial activities grow in prominence within the economy, and financial markets and 
measures increasingly guide economic activity.  
Financialized governance may not actually work well for most shareholders. Even when 
financialized governance benefits shareholders, significant tradeoffs and inefficiencies can 
arise from the conflict between maximizing financialized measures and society’s broader 
interest. For example, financialized governance provides incentives for slanted presentations 
of accounting data and even outright accounting fraud. Misconduct, fraud or law evasion 
directed at other stakeholders such as customers and governments may benefit shareholders, 
but they may ultimately have to bear legal expenses, large fines, and loss of reputation. 
Financialized incentives can also lead to misallocation through “short-termism” or 
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mismanagement of risk, whose upside benefits those controlling corporations while the 
downside harms others, including shareholders and the broader economy.  
Effective governance requires that those in control are accountable for actions they take. 
However, those who control and benefit most from corporations’ success are often able to avoid 
accountability. In cases such as corporate fraud or excessive endangerment in which the public 
is insufficiently aware of the potential conflicts, governments may fail to design and enforce 
the best rules because of the incentives of individuals within governments and their own lack 
of accountability.  
The important real-world issues around corporate governance do not fit neatly into most 
common economic frameworks and models. The history of corporate governance includes a 
parade of scandals and crises that have caused significant harm. Although each episode has its 
unique elements, fraud, deception or other forms of misconduct by individuals in corporations 
and in governments have often played a key role. After each scandal or crisis, the narratives of 
most key individuals tend to minimize their own culpability or the possibility that they could 
have done more to prevent the harm. Common claims from executives, boards of directors, 
auditors, rating agencies, politicians, and regulators include “we just didn’t know,” “we 
couldn’t have predicted,” or “it was just a few bad apples.” A recent report commissioned by 
the independent directors of Wells Fargo Bank regarding the scandal in which bank employees 
misled customers and fraudulently opened accounts for years referred to executives and the 
board being “disinclined to view the problem as systemic” despite numerous flags and 
opportunities to act (Independent Directors 2017, p. 6).  
Economists, as well, may react to corporate scandals and crises with their own version of 
“we just didn’t know,” as their models had ruled out certain possibilities. They may interpret 
events as benign, arising from exogenous forces out of anybody’s control, or try to fit the 
observations into alternative models. However, new models often still ignore highly relevant 
issues around incentives, governance, enforcement, and accountability. Economists may 
presume that observed reality is unchangeable or efficient under a set of frictions while leaving 
out other frictions and ways to address them through changes in governance practices or policy.    
Effective governance of institutions in the private and public sectors should make it 
impossible for individuals in these institutions to get away with claiming that harm was out of 
their control when in reality they had encouraged or enabled harmful misconduct and could 
have and should have taken action to prevent it. Better practices and policy would follow.     
 
Financialization and Shareholder Governance 
The last few decades have seen an expansion of financial activity and financial markets 
driven by a number of factors: increased volatility of exchange rates and interest rates, 
globalization, changes in financial regulations, and financial innovations such as securitization 
and derivatives (Davis 2011; Krippner 2011).  
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The expansion of financial activity has offered greater risk-sharing opportunities and 
enabled innovations, large-scale investments, and economic growth. However, it has also 
allowed risk to become hidden and magnified in an opaque and complex system that is rife 
with conflicts of interest (Partnoy 2009; Zingales 2015). Whereas  economists usually presume 
that the size of a sector is efficient if it is determined in markets, recent empirical work argues 
that “too much finance” may harm growth, create distortions, and contribute to income 
inequality (Cecchetti and Kharroubi 2015; Cournède and Denk 2015; Haan and Sturm 2016).   
My focus here is on the interaction of financialization and corporate governance. 
Financialized governance starts with the view, especially dominant in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, that corporations should focus on benefitting shareholders (Hansmann and 
Kraakman 2001). The economics and finance literatures have focused almost exclusively on 
the potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Bebchuk and Weisbach 
2010). In recent decades, the main approach to resolve that conflict has been to incent 
maximizing “shareholder value” by tying compensation to financial measures such as reported 
earnings per share, revenues, stock prices and return on equity.  
Prior to the 1970s, only 16 percent of the chief executive officers in S&P 500 companies 
had performance-based compensation, but this proportion grew to 26 percent  in the 1980s and 
47 percent in the 1990s (Bank, Cheffins and Wells 2017). The vast majority of large 
corporations today use earnings per share in incentive plans, and most use stock prices and 
shareholder returns in their compensation plans (Reda, Schmidt and Glass 2016). 
Compensation for managers (as well for as boards) typically includes restricted stocks and 
options. In this way, corporations are effectively “managed” by markets and by accounting-
based metrics (Davis 2011).1 
The prevalence of stock-based compensation affects the efficacy of corporate governance 
arrangements, but understanding the issues around corporate governance more fully requires a 
broader context. First, the shareholders of most public corporations today are not individuals 
but rather institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, or 
endowments, which are usually corporations themselves with their own governance challenges. 
Second, corporations may set up and invest in corporate subsidiaries, creating complex 
corporate structures. In this environment, stock prices do not measure properly whether 
managers actually benefit the majority of their ultimate shareholders. Third, some of the 
tradeoffs associated with financialized corporate governance are relevant even in the absence 
of shareholder-manager conflict and arise in the context of private corporations as well.  
                                                            
1 An alternative approach to motivating managers to focus on shareholder value relies on the 
market for corporate control (Manne 1965). The idea is that firms whose managers do not 
maximize shareholder value as measured by the stock price will be targets of hostile takeovers 
and the underperforming managers will be replaced. However, boards and managers can find 
ways to raise the costs of hostile takeovers such as poison pill provisions, and governments 
may block takeover transactions because of political pressures. Most corporate mergers today 
are “friendly.” 
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Consider the layered ownership structure of public corporations. Institutional investors 
accounted for only 6.1 percent of corporate ownership in the 1950s, and, by 2009, this fraction 
grew to 73 percent for the top 1,000 largest US corporations (Gilson and Gordon 2013). Mutual 
funds are usually subsidiaries of “management companies,” which are separate corporations 
with their own objectives (Bogle 2005). This ownership system creates new agency problems 
between corporate managers in the firms along the ownership chains and the investors at the 
ends of the chains. Moreover, those who control institutional investors have their own 
objectives that may conflict with their clients. The managers of institutional investors often 
have little incentives to engage in the governance of portfolio firms even it would benefit 
ultimate investors (Taub 2009). Gilson and Gordon (2013) refer to the conflicts between the 
interests of funds’ managers and investors as the “agency costs of agency capitalism.”  
Even if individuals held corporate shares directly, it is unclear that maximizing 
“shareholder value” as currently practiced captures the preferences of most or all shareholders. 
First, high-powered financialized incentives may be counterproductive when managers have 
multiple tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Second, modern portfolio theory suggests that 
investors should diversify their holdings, which means that shareholders often own shares in 
multiple firms in the same industry. As shareholders, they may benefit if firms collude, but lack 
of competition in product or labor markets harms them as customers or employees and distorts 
the economy. Indeed, shareholder unanimity is not assured except under unrealistic 
assumptions such as complete markets and perfect competition. Third, the ability to engage in 
short selling and trade derivatives can decouple the economic interests of some shareholders 
from their voting rights (Barry, Hatfield and Kominers 2013).  
An interesting phenomenon in a broader governance context is the proliferation of opaque 
shell corporations with no employees or publicly traded shares (Story and Soul 2015). 
Individuals and corporations often create them to limit liability, hide activities, or avoid taxes 
or other laws. Many jurisdictions, including Delaware (the most popular US state for 
incorporation) do not require any information about the shareholders — so-called “beneficial 
owners” — of corporations they register. One office building in Delaware is the legal address 
of 285,000 separate businesses; Delaware uses revenues from taxes and fees by absentee 
corporations to fund a significant part of its budget, and it has fought against federal legislation 
that would increase the transparency of corporate ownership (Wayne 2012).  
 
Tradeoffs from Financialized Corporate Governance 
Financialized, shareholder-focused governance is appealing in its logic. However, in 
addition to the issues already raised above, it introduces tradeoffs and potential distortions that 
can have significant impact on the economy. Corporations interact with most of their 
stakeholders, other than shareholders, through contracts and markets. Counterparties will be 
more willing to engage with corporations, make investments, and produce economic 
efficiencies if they trust that corporations would not harm them subsequent to their investments 
(Mayer 2013). For example, if lenders cannot trust the legal system to collect loans in a timely 
manner or prevent borrowers from exposing them to additional risk once the loan is made, they 
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will refuse to make loans or charge a high rate of interest. Creating trust requires being able to 
make credible commitments, but making commitments may be impossible, difficult, or costly. 
Dealing with externalities may require government action.  
The cost of making and enforcing commitments is ultimately borne by the corporations’ 
residual claimants and by society as a whole through the government that creates and enforces 
the rules. For corporations and their governance to support the economy best, it is important 
that contract enforcement be efficient, markets be competitive, and appropriate rules correct 
market failures and externalities. Financialized governance aims to focus corporate managers 
on benefitting shareholders, but it can result in gaps between what is good for executives, 
directors, and some shareholders and what is good for society as a whole.  
I will focus on two types of tradeoffs that derive from frictions such as asymmetric 
information and the difficulty and cost of effective commitments. First, financialized 
governance may lead managers to manipulate disclosures and engage in deception, fraud, or 
other misconduct. Second, financialized governance may cause inefficiencies through 
misallocation of resources and risk. The culprit in many of the examples appears to be a focus 
on financial metrics. The inefficiencies ultimately link to the weak or lacking incentives of 
those who are in a position to put in place mechanism to prevent harmful conduct.    
Corporate Opacity, Fraud, and Deception 
Enforceable contracts and effective governance require reliable and verifiable information. 
Extreme information asymmetries can cause markets, contract, laws, and the potential 
discipline of reputation concerns to break down. Thus, providing information that enables 
markets and contracts to function well, and which allows effective control and accountability, 
is a key governance issue.  
Managers whose compensation depends on financial targets have incentives to distort 
information and to divert time and energy to actions that improve the appearance of meeting 
or exceeding short-term financial targets. For example, managers may engage in “managing” 
earnings within allowable accounting standards (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998; Graham, 
Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). These activities may become deceptive or fraudulent, as happened 
at Tyco, Enron, WorldCom and numerous other institutions. Complex transactions in opaque 
derivatives markets and the creation of off-balance-sheet subsidiaries make it difficult to detect 
or distinguish financial fraud from other misleading disclosures, as illustrated by Lehman 
Brothers’ use of “repo 105” transactions (Eisinger 2017). The complexities of securitization 
and derivatives allow banks to manipulate valuations and hide losses (Piskorski, Seru and 
Witkin 2015). Opaque off-balance-sheet subsidiaries can make large banking institutions 
appear as “black boxes” to investors (Partnoy and Eisinger 2013). 
Corporate fraud or misrepresentation can remain hidden for extended periods or even 
indefinitely (Zingales 2015), which prevents effective accountability. It is often hard to pin the 
responsibility and intent to specific and appropriate individuals. There are also insufficient 
incentives or willingness within corporations to uncover fraud or deception, particularly if 
executives are able to benefit from such practices. Whistleblowers face hardships, lose jobs 
and opportunities, and may be unable to prevail if authorities are not inclined to pursue their 
6 
 
claims (Sawyer, Johnson and Holub 2010; Ben-Artzi 2016). Even if it is possible to trace 
misconduct to specific individuals, markets may do little to correct the problem. Financial 
advisors with record of misconduct continue to find employment (Egan, Matvos and Seru 
2017).  
The problem extends to auditors, which are supposed to be independent watchdogs, but in 
fact have weak incentives to uncover fraud and do not opine on the absence of fraud. Despite 
accounting scandals in the early 2000s that led to attempts to improve the quality of audits in 
the United States, Ronen (2010, in this journal) describes auditors as “lapdogs” and the 
Economist (2014b) calls them “dozy watchdogs.” Four large, for-profit corporations with little 
accountability to the public dominate the auditing industry. These companies are opaque 
themselves and some, such as KPMG, have been accused of fraud and obstruction of justice 
repeatedly in recent years (Eisinger 2017).  
Consumer fraud or deception, and other law evasion or misconduct, may actually benefit 
shareholders, particularly if the misconduct remains hidden. Of course, if and when problems 
come to light, the legal costs, fines and loss of reputation affect the corporation’s success and 
are borne by shareholders, employees and possibly others. Recent examples include 
Volkswagen’s evasion environmental regulations and the case of Wells Fargo Bank “cross 
selling” and improperly opening accounts. New informatoin on corporate prosecutions and 
misconduct keeps coming to the surface.2  
The costs to society of corporate opacity, fraud, and deception are high. Lack of trust by 
shareholders and other investors can increase the funding costs of corporations. Lenders who 
fail to recognize loan losses avoid restructuring loans and may continue to lend to insolvent 
borrowers rather than making new loans. Lingering debt overhang for households and lenders 
can contribute to long-term recessions that harm entire economies, as happened in Japan in the 
1980s, in the United States during the housing crisis, and European nations today (Admati and 
Hellwig 2013; Mian and Sufi 2015). Ownership chains involving shell corporations can also 
enable fraud and make contract enforcement and beneficial renegotiation more difficult, all of 
which were evident in the recent mortgage crisis (Dayen 2016). 
More subtle and harder to address are corporate strategies involving systematic and harmful 
deception that may cause significant social harm to shareholders and consumers. Consider, for 
example, tobacco companies that denied the addictiveness and harm from cigarettes for 
decades even as they had information inconsistent with the claims they made, or the campaign 
by the sugar industry to distort nutrition research and dietary guidelines by diverting attention 
away from the harm of sugar consumption.. Akerlof and Shiller (2016) discuss these and other 
cases where manipulation and deception by profit-maximizing corporations profit have caused 
distortions and harm. The main weapon against such strategies is public education and 
                                                            
2 A new Corporate Prosecution Registry (Garrett and Ashley 2017) at the University of Virginia Law 
School collects data on corporate prosecutions. The nonprofit Corporate Research Project collects 
information with the purpose of increasing corporate accountability, including “corporate rap sheets” 
(at http://corp-research.org/ )  
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awareness of how conflicts of interests can corrupt information sources, including even 
supposedly neutral academic research.  
Misallocation of Resources and Risk 
A related but somewhat different set of tradeoffs from financialized corporate governance 
involve inefficiencies from misallocation of resources and risk. First, managers may display 
“short-termism” in response to short-term accounting metrics and pass up worthy long-term 
investments (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). Second, financialized governance can 
encourage managers to endanger stakeholders—for example, by compromising product 
quality, the health and safety of customers or employees, or even the solvency of the 
corporation—particularly if such actions remain hidden and still allow the manager to be 
rewarded upfront, before risks materialize. Shareholders may be harmed by being exposed to 
excessive risks without compensation or even knowledge of the risk, but sometimes they 
benefit from endangering or harming other stakeholders.   
Because stock prices reflect assessments of future cash flows, stock-based compensation is 
less prone to causing distortions than compensation based on short-term accounting measures. 
In theory, if all investors have the same information as managers, their holding periods or 
investment horizons do not matter, and neither does the timing of dividends. In that special 
case, the stock price reflects the consequences of all corporate action for shareholders. If 
managers of public corporations reinvest profits in worthy projects, shareholders who need 
immediate cash can sell shares at prices that reflects the investments.  
Accordingly, in the standard teaching of basic finance, shareholders agree that managers 
should invest in projects that create value for the corporation, and increases in firm value raise 
the share price. The conclusions change if managers have different information than investors. 
In such cases, managers may make inefficient decisions that harm shareholders (and possibly 
others) while inflating stock prices even in the absence of an underlying managers-shareholders 
conflict (Narayanan 1985; Stein 1989).  
Compensation based on earnings or return on equity targets without accounting for risk 
create significant distortions that can harm shareholders (Admati and Hellwig 2013). For 
example, it encourages managers to magnify risk by using debt even if doing so harms 
shareholders and others. The incentives are particularly strong if managers can reduce taxes for 
the corporation or take risk in ways that magnify the upside for shareholders while sharing 
downside risk with others.   
Managers can also “front load” the upside and reap large bonuses, because return measures 
are high at first while potential losses, realized later, fall mainly on shareholders and others 
(Bhagat 2017). Those who manage institutional investors such as asset management 
companies, pension funds, mutual funds and endowments may also be judged by short-term 
return measures and expose the ultimate investors to excessive risk (Bogle 2005; Partnoy 
2009). In some cases like public pension funds, banks with insured deposits or institutions 
whose creditors are likely to receive support from governments or central banks, a share of the 
downside risk ultimately falls on taxpayers.  
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Risk taking in innovation, where those who take the risk bear the downside, is useful and 
beneficial if taken properly and responsibly. Indeed, managers fearing for their jobs may be 
excessively risk averse and take too little such risk. The problem of excessive risk taking arises 
when executives can shift downside risk and endanger others inefficiently. Cases such as 
Volkswagen, British Petroleum, or the nuclear industry in Japan illustrate the problem and the 
potential harm that can result. Dispersed consumers or the public do not have sufficient 
information or ability to bring about safer practices or to prompt action to eliminate products 
that turn out to be unsafe (Felcher 2001).  
Another example of the harmful consequences of financialized corporate governance that 
may lead to lower firm value and collateral harm is excessive use of debt funding by 
corporations. Managers acting on behalf of shareholders of indebted corporations make 
investment and funding decisions that may not maximize the total value of the corporation. In 
particular, they may make excessively risky investments increases indebtedness inefficiently 
because shareholders benefit fully from the upside of risk while sharing an increased downside 
risk with creditors (or others). At the same time, indebted corporations avoid taking actions 
that benefit creditors and the corporation as a whole at shareholders’ expense, such as beneficial 
reductions of indebtedness and some worthy investments with insufficient “upside” (Admati, 
DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer, forthcoming).  
Heavy borrowing thus leads to distorted investments and to an increased risk of defaults 
and bankruptcies that entail deadweight cost and, for large corporations, can cause collateral 
harm to employees, customers, and the community. The problem of excessive and reckless use 
of debt is particularly harmful in banking, where passive depositors and short-term creditors 
do not provide market discipline, and explicit and implicit guarantees exacerbate the 
distortions, essentially feeding a “debt addiction” that characterizes heavy borrowing. Unless 
regulations counter the harmful incentives, the result is distorted credit markets, financial 
instability, including periodic financial crises, and further governance problems, recklessness, 
and distorted competition when institutions are considered “too big to fail.” 
 
Some Policy Proposals 
The key to improving corporate governance is to increase transparency, create better 
internal and external control and accountability, and address distortions and inefficiencies 
through effective laws and regulations. With financialized governance, executives will 
obviously seek to maintain market power and prevent entry, and antitrust laws should attempt 
to promote competition and entry. I will focus this discussion on addressing the potential 
inefficiencies discussed above from opacity, fraud, and excessive endangerment.    
One place to start reducing corporate opacity would be to require shell corporations to 
reveal the identity of their beneficial owners, and any limits to their liability, so that authorities 
and the public can better track chains of ownership. Such laws exist in many jurisdictions but, 
surprisingly, not in United States (Caldwell 2016). It also makes sense to consider whether the 
privilege of incorporation should be available as easily as it is now. One idea is that 
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incorporations would require a disclosure of purpose, at least in general terms, which would be 
revised and examined periodically with possible termination if the corporation is primarily set 
for the purpose of increasing opacity and evading laws. Such examinations could also lead to 
charges of tax evasion or fraud.   
For large corporations, it may be useful to find more un-conflicted sources of information 
outside the corporations by providing incentives to independent analysts to expose misconduct, 
given the difficulty of relying on whistleblowers and the conflicts of interest of auditors and 
rating agencies paid by the corporations. Since producing reliable information is so critical for 
effective governance, it may be desirable to delegate some of these functions to government 
agencies or to not-for-profit organizations with committed and un-conflicted experts.3 Unless 
rating agencies are more accountable to the public, regulations and institutional investors 
should avoid relying on their scores (Partnoy 2016). 
As abstract entities, corporations cannot go to jail. Extracting fines from corporations does 
not prevent corporate fraud and misconduct if shareholder governance is weak. The individuals 
who are involved in, encourage or tolerate corporate misconduct or law evasion often benefit 
from effective personal impunity, because their personal culpability or intent cannot be 
established with sufficient confidence to meet a legal standard. Unless shareholder governance 
is effective, executives and board members also rarely lose their jobs. 
The ability to deter large corporations from bad behavior is limited by the fact that imposing 
the most severe punishments — huge fines, or worse, the revocation of license to conduct 
business — would cause significant collateral harm to innocent employees and others (Garrett 
2016). Such issues do not arise if we increase accountability for individual executives and 
board members. Doing so may require re-examination of the laws and rules defining liability 
that would give authorities sufficient tools to pursue individuals in civil and criminal courts, 
and to claw back pay. Devoting sufficient resources to investigations of individuals, which tend 
to be complex and risky, may also be necessary (Eisinger 2017). 
There have been attempts to improve corporate governance and prevent accounting fraud 
through laws. However, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that came as a response to the Enron 
bankruptcy and the numerous accounting scandals around that time did not prevent the massive 
fraud and deception by many financial firms that contributed to the housing crisis and to the 
near implosion of the financial system in 2008 (Coates and Srinivasan 2014). There is also no 
evidence that independent directors have prevented fraud (Avci, Schipani and Seyhun2017). 
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act has done little to address corporate fraud except for attempting to 
encourage whistleblowers.  
Many deceptive practices fall in a gray area where it is difficult to identify or establish that 
they are fraudulent with intent to deceive as defined under law. To prevent corporations from 
                                                            
3 Shifting the responsibility for choosing auditors to private insurance companies (Ronen 2010) 
may be helpful but it does not address the distorted incentives of individuals in response to 
their own compensation and the lack of personal accountability when responsibility is diffused.    
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hiding safety problems that they are aware of, laws are needed to force corporations to take 
strong action to inform consumers about safety issues and to prohibit settlements that 
specifically obscure safety violations. Consumer protection laws are useful when it is difficult 
for consumers to evaluate products, e.g., in the context of financial services (Campbell 2016). 
Educating the public to be more aware of potential conflicts of interest, thus creating savvier 
consumers of products and information, including from experts and media, would also help.  
To address the problem of corporations transferring risk inefficiently to others and 
misallocating resources, it is important that incentives offered to managers create a long-term 
focus. Corporations should also have processes to ensure that relevant information about safety 
issues is not diffused or lost and reaches executives in positions of control. Measures that 
prevent or reduce harm are obviously better for all, including shareholders who would 
otherwise deal with fines and the company’s loss of reputation.  
Effective laws and regulations are essential when competitive markets and contracts do not 
work to create effective commitments or in the presence of externalities. In creating laws and 
regulations, the key should be first on prevention of harm if it can be achieved at a reasonable 
cost rather than focusing on how to deal with the conduct after the fact. For example, preventing 
traffic accidents through appropriate traffic laws such as speed limits and proper infrastructure 
is better than relying solely on insurance, fines, prisons, civil litigations and ambulances. 
Similarly, it may be significantly more cost efficient and prevent collateral harm to try to detect 
and address misconduct, fraud and endangerment early than to deal with consequences such as 
nuclear disasters, oil spills, car explosions, or financial crises once they happen. In the case of 
children’s products in the United States, for example, safety standards are lax and corporations 
often obscure information about unsafe products (Felcher 2001).  
Of course, it is important that policymakers choose the least costly ways to achieve prudent 
conduct. Yet, some laws are counterproductive and interfere with efficient governance. For 
example, tax laws in many jurisdictions favor debt over equity funding. Such laws are distortive 
by creating incentives for inefficient indebtedness (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2009; Admati, 
DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer, forthcoming). This feature of tax codes is particularly 
perverse for banks, which already have incentives to choose dangerous debt levels. The 
Economist (2015) called tax-free debt “a vast distortion in the world economy [that] is wholly 
man-made.” Bankruptcy codes that favor commitments in derivatives and short-term debt (so-
called repos) over other corporate liabilities, and which also exacerbate the conflict of interest 
between managers with financialized compensation and society, should be changed (Skeel and 
Jackson 2012).  
 
Political Economy and Corporate Governance 
By putting in place laws and regulations and by enforcing contracts and rules, governments 
play a critical role in affecting corporate governance practices and determining how well 
corporations serve society. The determination of the rules in turn, and how they affect different 
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stakeholders, depend on policymakers’ incentives and on the political process (Pagano and 
Volpin 2005).  Policymakers may help corporations create useful commitments and thus 
become more efficient, or instead impose excessive and costly rules on some corporations 
while tolerating or even perversely encouraging reckless conduct in other contexts.  
To see some of the issues, it is instructive to compare corporate governance and aviation 
safety. A key reason for the safety of airplane travel is that lapses in safety are extremely salient 
to the public. Authorities design rules that anticipate potential problems and reduce, and they 
investigate problems promptly. In addition, the incentives of those in the private aviation 
sector, from the airplane manufacturers to the airlines employees to those working in airports 
to monitor air traffic do not conflict with the public’s interest in safety. Finally, a key 
underlying reason for aviation safety has to do with accountability. In virtually all plane 
crashes, it is possible to point to the cause of the crash. Individuals found responsible or 
negligent stand to lose jobs or reputation from plane crashes, and they might even get into legal 
trouble. Although it takes much technology and collaboration across jurisdictions, safety 
prevails in aviation and mistakes rarely recur.  
Corporate governance issues are in some cases starkly different. When those in control of 
corporations can harm others in abstract or invisible ways such as excessive financial risk or 
other subtle endangerment, governments may lack the political will to consider the issues, do 
a thorough autopsy when problems arise and invest properly in putting in place effective rules 
to prevent the problems from repeating. Governments may enact inefficient, excessive, or 
wasteful rules that create or exacerbate distortions in order to serve other political objectives.  
Even when corporate governance failures becomes clear, for example in scandals or crises, 
it is often hard to trace the harm to specific individuals or policies. The governance and 
accountability of government institutions can become a challenge for society. I discuss several 
issues that arise at the intersection of political economy and corporate governance: capture, law 
enforcement, and companies operating across legal jurisdictions. I then offer the financial 
industry as an example in which these issues are particularly stark.   
Capture 
Laws and regulations will not work well when those charged with setting and implementing 
them collaborate with those in the industry even if these collaborations harm the public (Stigler 
1971; Acemoglu 2003). The dynamics of capture are often subtle. Corporations employ 
lobbyists, consultants, lawyers, public relation firms, and influential, connected individuals to 
shape rules and their implementation. Such activities have expanded greatly in recent years 
(Drutman 2015). The realities of revolving doors and campaign finance in the United States 
have increased the impact of those who can fund politicians (Lessig 2012).  
When the issues are complex and government resources are limited, staffers and 
policymakers sometimes rely on corporations and their lobbyists to draft rules (Lipton and 
Protess 2013). Complex laws and regulations create a bloated ecosystem of experts who find 
revolving opportunities in the private and government sector based on knowing the details 
(McCarty 2013; Lucca, Seru and Trebbi 2014).  
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The actual workings of capture and the corrosive impact it can have on the effectiveness of 
governments are often invisible. If budgets are tight and expertise lies mostly with conflicted 
individuals, rules are more likely to become distorted and fail to serve the public interest. The 
“thin political markets” that produce the rules do not balance the interests of different 
constituents, affecting even basic accounting rules, which are the fundamental building blocks 
of effective governance (Ramanna 2015). The mix of genuine confusion and distorted 
incentives compound the problems and leads to “intellectual capture” (Johnson and Kwak 
2010).   
Given the critical importance of appropriate and well-crafted rules, reducing the wage 
disparity between policymakers and the private sector would be desirable. Low salaries 
encourage the government-to-lobbyist revolving door and may deprive the government of 
experts who are more likely to stand up to pressure from the industry and protect the public 
interest through effective rules (Drutman 2015).  
Corporations fight against rules and their implementation in courts, where outcomes often 
depend both on the on the biases and ability of specific judges to understand the complex issues 
and the quality of the lawyers making the arguments. The resources of corporations often 
overwhelm those that governments are able or willing to devote to the issues.  
It does not follow from this discussion of capture that governments should impose no rules 
on corporations or, alternatively, that all regulations are useful. Rather, my point is that the 
incentives of those who work in government matter, and that it is important that they use their 
power properly and be accountable to the public. Governments can fail by intervening too much 
or too little, by creating inefficient and excessively complex rules, or by not devoting enough 
resources to writing and enforcing rules. Rules should be as cost-beneficial as possible to 
address market failures while avoiding waste of taxpayer or corporate resources. Preventing 
capture and providing proper incentives for regulators and others involved in policy is itself an 
important objective (Carpenter and Moss 2013).  
Effectiveness of Enforcement 
A related issue is that laws and regulations may fail to achieve their goals if governments 
do not enforce them consistently and effectively. As a representative example, consider the 
Deutsche Bank whistleblower who contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to report a significant mismarking of derivatives position; this case only received attention after 
the media investigated and reported the allegations (Ben-Artzi 2016). The result was a fine of 
$55 million, effectively paid by current shareholders, with little if any direct consequences for 
those responsible for the fraud. Revolving doors between Deutsche Bank compliance and SEC 
enforcement may have played a role in this case.  
The US Department of Justice and other regulatory agencies have changed how they handle 
corporate crime, particularly fraud, since the late 1990s. The main tool has become settlements 
with deferred prosecutions and fines, while indictments of individuals, particularly executives, 
have become extremely rare since the cases of Enron and others in the early 2000s. Among the 
reasons for the shift is the length and complexity of investigations and trials of individuals, lack 
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of investigative resources, and the loss of some legal tools to pursue individuals (Eisinger 
2017). However, large fines do not appear to change corporate culture or act as deterrent 
(Garrett 2016).  
If lack of resources undermines enforcement, misconduct is even less likely to surface, and 
it thus can become more prevalent. For example, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act expanded the scope 
of the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)’s jurisdiction dramatically, 
beyond the $34 trillion US futures market to the much larger market in derivatives traded 
outside established exchanges, estimated to be as large as $400 trillion in so-called “notional 
value.” Yet the agency is severely underfunded, relative to other agencies and given the 
enormous size of the markets it oversees. One person at the CFTC oversees the $117 billion 
U.S. oil market where wholesale prices for gasoline and heating oil are set (Leising 2017). The 
departing head of compliance of CFTC said in March 2017 that the agency is unable to 
investigate the “massive amount of misconduct” in derivatives markets (Freifeld 2017). The 
effectiveness of banking regulations also depends significantly on the resources and incentives 
of regulators (Agrawal, Lucca, Seru and Trebbi2014). 
Regulation across Jurisdictions 
The political economy of corporations involves competition among jurisdictions. This 
competition can happen within countries: as noted, state-level corporate havens such as 
Delaware may benefit while harming taxpayers and citizens in other jurisdictions such as the 
US federal government. Holding corporations responsible can be even harder in the context of 
a global economy. At the international level, Panama, Liberia and Bermuda are popular havens 
for many corporations and wealthy individuals (Davis 2011), but the United States and some 
other developed nations are among the easiest places to hide wealth (Economist 2016). 
Corporations can “shop jurisdictions” and set up opaque corporations or subsidiaries that 
allow them to avoid taxes or other laws (OECD 2015). The process of negotiating and 
coordinating of international regulation often results in a race to the bottom that lessens the 
effectiveness of the regulations that would have otherwise been adopted in at least some 
countries. Politicians tend to side with “their” corporations, because corporate voice is more 
salient to them than the broader and more passive public whose voice might be missing (Admati 
and Hellwig 2013, Chapter 12).  
Corporations have also used international trade agreements to challenge actions of 
governments. Opaque tribunals of private lawyers, where corporations can sue but 
governments cannot sue or appeal on behalf of their citizens, adjudicate disputes between 
corporations and national governments, (Economist 2014a).  
 
Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector 
Banks and the financial industry provide an extreme illustration of the distortions created 
by financialized corporate governance and the shortcomings of laws and regulations. History 
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shows that in the context of banking, governments often lack the political will needed to 
address market failures, and the difficulty of commitments, through effective rules. Sovereign 
default and other government actions have often caused banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009).  
Today, and even after the crisis of 2007-2009, the result of the combined failure of 
corporate governance and policy is a set of overly fragile financial institutions and a highly 
interconnected and fragile system that endangers and harms the economy unnecessarily. In 
extreme contrast with aviation, where many individuals and institutions collaborate to maintain 
safety, most of those within the private and public institutions involved in the financial sector 
benefit personally from practices that create excessive endangerment and by concealing this 
reality from the public (Admati and Hellwig 2013; Admati 2017).   
Economists treat banks as special because of their role in the payment system and their 
intermediation function, although loans can — and are — made by other types of institutions. 
Because banking has always been fragile and has repeatedly produced cycles of booms, busts 
and crisis, a common view is that fragility is inherent to banking and fundamentally 
unavoidable.  
It is true that banks are prone to liquidity problems: that is, circumstances can arise in which 
they have trouble converting illiquid assets to cash quickly at a reasonable price to satisfy 
creditors’ demands. These problems can result in panics and runs if depositors and short-term 
creditors withdraw their funding. Banks can reduce the likelihood of such problems by 
reducing their opacity and indebtedness (for example by using their profits as a source of 
funding or issuing more shares and having better disclosures). However, banks have been able 
to remain dangerously and inefficiently indebted and to obscure the true exposure to risk of 
their shareholders, creditors and taxpayers through opaque disclosures.  
When banks were run as partnerships in 19th century England, they commonly funded half 
of their loans with equity, and their owners or shareholders had unlimited liability, exposing 
their personal wealth to the risk that their bank’s assets would not be sufficient to pay deposits. 
A century ago in the United States, bank equity levels were around 20 percent or more and 
shareholders often had increased liability. Over the years, banks became limited liability 
corporations and some operate within large holding companies engaging in extensive trading 
and other activities beyond making loans to individuals and businesses. To prevent disruptions 
from liquidity problems and runs, governments have created safety nets such as deposit 
insurance and central bank lending. These safety nets can cause weakening and even 
breakdown of corporate governance.  
What actually makes banks and other financial institutions “special” is their unusual ability 
to shift downside risk and costs to others and the fact that normal market forces do not work to 
counter the distorted incentives of those who control them. For example, outside banking, 
bankruptcy courts prevent shareholders of insolvent corporations from benefitting at the 
expense of creditors, for example by “looting” the corporation or gambling for resurrection 
inefficiently. By contrast, hidden insolvencies can persist in so-called “zombie banks” if 
authorities do not intervene, because depositors and short-term creditors use their ability to 
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withdraw funding, close out their positions, or count on explicit or implicit guarantees to 
protect themselves (Akerlof and Romer 1993; Skeel and Jackson 2012).  
Financial innovations such as securitization and derivatives, and the creation of complex 
structures around the globe have also allowed financial institutions to take risks and increase 
their indebtedness while hiding their true financial health from investors and regulators 
(Partnoy and Eisinger 2013). Corporate structures are particularly complex and opaque in large 
banking institutions (Carmassi and Herring 2014).  
Poor risk governance and the distorted incentives of traders, described in many books about 
the culture of banking since the 1980s (for example, Partnoy 2009; Das 2010), appear to persist. 
The US Senate investigation of the JPMorgan Chase “whale trades” in 2013, which involved 
taking on huge positions in thinly traded markets in London leading to losses of over $6 billion, 
showed that risk controls in at last some of the largest institutions remain highly problematic 
(Norris 2013). However, except in such extreme cases, or after bankruptcies or crises, poor risk 
governance in banking is invisible.     
Governments can counter the incentives for endangerment in banking, for example, by 
insisting that shareholders bear more of the risks they take and by reducing the opacity of the 
system through better disclosures and tracking of risk. Bank lobbyists often threaten that such 
steps would “harm credit and growth.” In fact, the most costly and harmful outcomes arise 
from a combination of too much credit in boom times, overly complex and ineffective 
regulations that exacerbate governance and other distortions, and “extend and pretend” policies 
that tolerate and support insolvent and dysfunctional banks and other borrowers for too long.  
The dynamics of regulatory capture are particularly strong in the financial sector 
(Connaughton 2012). US Senator Richard Durbin admitted in a 2009 interview that “banks are 
still the most powerful lobby in Capitol Hill and they frankly own the place.”  
The regulatory capture problem arises because politicians often view banks and financial 
firms as a source of funding for favored projects rather than as a source of risk for the public, 
and thus choose to make cut deals that compromise efficiency and stability. Even after the 
devastating financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the recession that followed, policymakers failed 
to learn key lessons. Implicit guarantees, which perversely encourage and reward recklessness 
and are ultimately costly to the public, appear free to politicians. The jargon and technical 
issues and the abstract nature of the risk muddle the policy debate and create public confusion 
about the issues and the relevant tradeoffs (Admati and Hellwig 2013; Admati 2016, 2017).  
Other misconduct such as fraud and deception plague the financial sector, leading to 
invisible harm to many and to hundreds of billions in fines in recent years (Zingales 2015). The 
largest financial institutions, considered “too big to fail” have outsized power that distorts 
competition and the economy, and they are especially inefficient and dangerous, being 
effectively above the rules. Fragmented regulatory structures, such as in the United States, and 
the ability to play off governments and regulatory agencies, have made financial regulation 
particularly challenging to design and enforce. The main problem remains the lack of collective 
political will to create a safe and efficient global financial system.  
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Conclusion 
Milton Friedman (1970) famously argued that the social responsibility of corporate 
managers is to “make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, 
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.” Friedman presumes that 
the firms operate in an environment of “open and free competition without deception and 
fraud,” and he warns that chief executive officers who “pontificate” about corporate social 
responsibility will bring back “the iron fist of government bureaucrats.”  
However, “free and open” markets may not become competitive and without deception and 
fraud on their own. Rules matter. The limited liability and separate legal status of corporations 
has benefits, but it also creates problems of misaligned incentives, and lack of individual 
accountability exacerbates these problems. Those who manage firms will respond in 
predictable ways to financialized incentives. Private sector mechanisms such as auditors or 
rating agencies are unlikely to uncover fraud, or provide reliable information, without law 
enforcement and proper regulations and oversight.  
The interactions between governments and corporations, even in well-functioning 
democracies, can promote efficiency, but they can also be wasteful and exacerbate distortions 
that benefit only few. The issue is not the size of governments, but rather conflicts of interests 
affecting people in all institutions, and particularly the quality, integrity, and effectiveness of 
the institutions that design, implement and enforce the rules.  
Distortions from inefficient corporate governance are important determinants of economic 
outcomes. To ensure competition and create accountability, brave and well-informed 
policymakers --- including brave government bureaucrats --- must erect and implement 
effective systems that can counter the incentives of corporate managers to extract rents, 
deceive, and mismanage risk. In a democracy, individuals in governments must also be 
accountable if they fail to act in the public interest. In reality, inefficient governance may 
persist.  
The status quo, in which governments too often tolerate or exacerbate corporate governance 
distortions rather than alleviate them, is dangerous and harmful. Positive change requires better 
understanding of the underlying reasons. Economists can play an important role by studying 
these important issues, clarifying the tradeoffs associated with governance mechanisms, 
identifying instances where markets and institutions cause harm, and suggesting approaches to 
reduce the scope for abuses of power by individuals in all institutions. Increasing transparency, 
holding those in control more accountable, and creating and enforcing better laws and 
regulations to address corporate fraud and endangerment would be highly beneficial.  
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